Immanuel Kant defines virtue as a kind of strength and resoluteness of will to resist and overcome any obstacles that oppose fulfilling our moral duties. Human agents, according to Kant, owe it to ourselves to strive for perfect virtue by fully committing ourselves to morality and by developing the fortitude to maintain and execute this life-governing policy despite obstacles we may face. This essay reviews basic features of Kant’s conception of virtue and then discusses the role of emotions, a motive (...) of duty, exemplars, rules, and community in a virtuous life. Kant thinks that striving to be more virtuous requires not only respect for moral principles and control of our contrary emotions but also a system of legally enforced rules and communities of good persons. Exemplars and cultivated good feelings and emotions can also be useful aids along the way, but Kant warns us against attempting to derive our moral standards themselves from examples or feelings. The best any of us can hope for, in Kant’s view, is to make constant progress in our difficult struggle for moral perfection. (shrink)

Thomas E. Hill, Jr., interprets and extends Kant's moral theory in a series of essays that highlight its relevance to contemporary ethics. He introduces the major themes of Kantian ethics and explores its practical application to questions about revolution, prison reform, and forcible interventions in other countries for humanitarian purposes.

The moral significance of preserving natural environments is not entirely an issue of rights and social utility, for a person’s attitude toward nature may be importantly connected with virtues or human excellences. The question is, “What sort of person would destroy the natural environment--or even see its value solely in cost/benefit terms?” The answer I suggest is that willingness to do so may well reveal the absence of traits which are a natural basis for a proper humility, self-acceptance, gratitude, and (...) appreciation of the good in others. (shrink)

The moral significance of preserving natural environments is not entirely an issue of rights and social utility, for a person’s attitude toward nature may be importantly connected with virtues or human excellences. The question is, “What sort of person would destroy the natural environment--or even see its value solely in cost/benefit terms?” The answer I suggest is that willingness to do so may well reveal the absence of traits which are a natural basis for a proper humility, self-acceptance, gratitude, and (...) appreciation of the good in others. (shrink)

Contemporary discussions of practical reason often refer vaguely to the Kantian conception of reasons as an alternative to various means-ends theories, but it is rarely clear what this is supposed to be, except that somehow moral concerns are supposed to fare better under the Kantian conception. The theories of Nagel, Gewirth, Darwall, and Donagan have been labeled “Kantian” because they deviate strikingly from standard preference models, but their roots in Kant have not been traced in detail and important differences may (...) go unnoticed. All this is not surprising, of course, because Kant’s conception of practical reason is inseparable from his ideas of freedom, which are notoriously difficult and controversial. It is hard enough to characterize these ideas accurately in Kantian terminology, harder still to explain them in terms of contemporary debates about reasons for action. (shrink)

Contemporary discussions of practical reason often refer vaguely to the Kantian conception of reasons as an alternative to various means-ends theories, but it is rarely clear what this is supposed to be, except that somehow moral concerns are supposed to fare better under the Kantian conception. The theories of Nagel, Gewirth, Darwall, and Donagan have been labeled “Kantian” because they deviate strikingly from standard preference models, but their roots in Kant have not been traced in detail and important differences may (...) go unnoticed. All this is not surprising, of course, because Kant’s conception of practical reason is inseparable from his ideas of freedom, which are notoriously difficult and controversial. It is hard enough to characterize these ideas accurately in Kantian terminology, harder still to explain them in terms of contemporary debates about reasons for action. (shrink)

Is Kantian Ethics guilty of utopian thinking? First, potentially good and bad uses of utopian ideals are distinguished, then an apparent path is traced from Rousseau’s unworkable political ideal to Kant’s ethical ideal. Three versions of Kant’s Categorical Imperative are examined briefly for the ways that they may raise the suspicion that they manifest or encourage bad utopian thinking. In each case Kantians have available responses to counter the suspicion, but special attention is directed to the version that says “Act (...) on the maxims of a universally law–giving member of a kingdom of ends.” Interpretations vary, but here primary focus is on one contemporary reconstruction and development of this central idea. Several objections suggest that this idea encourages bad utopian thinking are briefly addressed: that we cannot count on everyone to follow ideal rules, that even conscientious people disagree in their moral judgments, and that theories that allow exceptions to familiar moral rules create a “slippery slope” to moral chaos. (shrink)

Ancient moral philosophers, especially Aristotle and his followers, typically shared the assumption that ethics is primarily concerned with how to achieve the final end for human beings, a life of “happiness” or “human flourishing.” This final end was not a subjective condition, such as contentment or the satisfaction of our preferences, but a life that could be objectively determined to be appropriate to our nature as human beings. Character traits were treated as moral virtues because they contributed well toward this (...) ideal life, either as means to it or as constitutive aspects of it. Traits that tended to prevent a “happy” life were considered vices, even if they contributed to a life that was pleasant and what a person most wanted. The idea of “happiness” was central, then, in philosophical efforts to specify what we ought to do, what sort of persons we should try to become, and what sort of life a wise person would hope for. (shrink)

Philosophers have debated for millennia about whether moral requirements are always rational to follow. The background for these debates is often what I shall call “the self-interest model.” The guiding assumption here is that the basic demand of reason, to each person, is that one must, above all, advance one's self-interest. Alternatively, debate may be framed by a related, but significantly different, assumption: the idea that the basic rational requirement is to develop and pursue a set of personal ends in (...) an informed, efficient, and coherent way, whether one's choice of ends is based on self-interested desires or not. For brevity I refer to this as “the coherence-and-efficiency model.” Advocates of both models tend to think that, while it is sufficiently clear in principle what the rational thing to do is, what remains in doubt is whether it is always rational to be moral. They typically assume that morality is concerned, entirely or primarily, with our relations to others, especially with obligations that appear to require some sacrifice or compromise with the pursuit of self-interest. (shrink)

Reviews the role of happiness in Kant's moral and political philosophy and contrasts his ideas of happiness with ideas of human flourishing prominent in ancient philosophy. It considers possible reasons why Kant avoided the latter and worked instead with more subjective conceptions of happiness. This was apparently due not merely to historical influences or misunderstanding of ancient ethics but also to Kant's respect for the moral freedom of individuals to choose, within limits, the way of life they prefer. Kant's understanding (...) of happiness affects his ideas of intrinsic value, prudence, beneficence, and the aim of government. Michael Slote's charge that Kantian ethics requires us to devalue our own happiness relative to others’ arguably rests on a flawed analogy between beneficence to others and promoting one's own happiness. (shrink)

Reviews briefly Kant's conceptions of punishment and conscience and then considers the role of punishment and conscience as motives in a moral life. From a Kantian perspective, both motives seem to lack moral worth. We note, however, that some motives, such as anticipation of grief and a desire to do worthy deeds, can be interpreted in two ways, one commendable and the other less so. By analogy, the essay argues that anticipation of punishment and pangs of conscience can motivate us (...) in two different ways, one morally worthy and the other not. (shrink)

In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant suggests that the bad results of wrongful acts can always be imputed to the agent but the bad results of dutiful acts can never be. Although Kant's concern in the context was apparently legal imputation, the article considers how Kant's doctrine might apply to questions about moral responsibility for bad consequences in cases where legal enforcement is inappropriate. First , interpretative questions are addressed. For example, does imputation imply being to blame for bad results (...) or merely being liable to compensate for them? What are the criteria for bad results? What is the relation between assessments of responsibility for bad consequences and judgments of the moral worth or desert of the agent? Is the operative notion of "results" or "consequences" a descriptive or normative one? The suggestion is that liability, not blame, is what is crucial, and wrong-doers are responsible for whatever bad causally results from their misdeeds, whether it was foreseeable or not. Second , putative counter-examples to Kant's doctrine are evaluated: for example, cases where it seems an agent may be liable for bad consequences even when doing what is permissible, dutiful, or even meritorious. Although many of the objections fail to survive examination, there remain cases where bad results of a wrongful act cannot plausibly be imputed to the agent and other cases where the agent seems clearly liable for bad results despite having acted innocently. Such intuitive objections, however, must be reviewed from a larger perspective of a systematic moral theory. In der Metaphysik der Sitten nimmt Kant an, daß die schlechten Folgen einer pflichtwidrigen Handlung dem Handelnden stets zugerechnet werden können, im Gegensatz zu den schlechten Folgen pflichtgemäßer Handlungen, die dem Handelnden niemals zugerechnet werden können. Obwohl es Kant im Kontext der Metaphysik der Sitten offensichtlich auf die juridische Zurechnung ankommt, geht es im vorstehenden Beitrag um die Frage, ob sich Kants Lehre auf die moralische Verantwortlichkeit für schlechte Folgen in denjenigen Fällen übertragen läßt, in denen eine juridische Normdurchsetzung unpassend ist. Und zwar geht es erstens um eine angemessene Interpretation der einschlägigen Textstellen selbst. Etwa: Meint "Zurechnung", daß der Handelnde für die schlechten Folgen seiner Handlung zu tadeln ist, oder meint "Zurechnung" lediglich seine Haftung für den angerichteten Schaden? Was sind die Kriterien dafür, Folgen als "schlechte" Folgen zu bezeichnen? Welches Verhältnis besteht zwischen der Zurechnung von Verantwortlichkeit für schlechte Folgen und dem Urteil über den moralischen Wert oder das moralische Verdienst des Handelnden? Ist "Folge" als operativer Begriff deskriptiv oder normativ zu verstehen? Der Beitrag geht davon aus, daß Haftung, und nicht Tadel, das eigentlich Entscheidende ist und daß, wer pflichtwidrig handelt, für alles Schlechte verantwortlich ist, das von seinen Taten verursacht wird, und zwar gleichgültig, ob es vorhersehbar war oder nicht. Zweitens geht es um vermeintliche Gegenbeispiele zu Kants Theorie. Etwa: Es werden Fälle erörtert, bei denen es so zu sein scheint, daß der Handelnde auch für solche schlechten Folgen haftet, die aus einem erlaubten, einem pflichtgemäßen oder sogar aus einem verdienstlichen Handeln herrühren. Obwohl viele Einwände einer näheren Überprüfung nicht standhalten, gibt es doch Fälle, bei denen die Zurechnung der schlechten Folgen einer pflichtwidrigen Handlung immer noch als unplausibel, und andere Fälle, bei denen die Zurechnung der schlechten Folgen einer nicht pflichtwidrigen Handlung immer noch als notwendig erscheint. Solche intuitiven Einwände sind von dem höheren Standpunkt einer systematischen Moraltheorie aus zu beantworten. (shrink)

In thirteen specially written essays, leading philosophers explore Kantian themes in moral and political philosophy that are prominent in the work of Thomas E. Hill, Jr., such as respect and self-respect, practical reason, conscience, and duty. In conclusion Hill offers an overview of his work and responses to the preceding essays.

Kant’s announced aim in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals is “to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality.” Kerstein focuses on Kant’s efforts to achieve the first task, which is seeking to identify the only possible supreme principle of morality. Kerstein explicitly sets aside the second task, which is to “establish” the supreme principle as necessary and binding on all rational agents. In other words, Kerstein is concerned with Kant’s “derivation” of the supreme moral principle but (...) not with its “deduction.” Nevertheless, his project is important, for a successful derivation would entail that utilitarianism, perfectionism, and other competitors to the Categorical Imperative are not viable candidates for being the supreme moral principle. (shrink)

In a morally perfect world we would not face many of the hard choices which confront us in the real world. If everyone were fully conscientious, moral dilemmas might still be posed by natural circumstances; but many of our most difficult and tragic choices would not arise. In particular, we would never need to decide whether we should ourselves do a lesser evil in order to prevent someone else from doing a greater one. Unfortunately we do not live in such (...) a perfect world. Through greed, malice, jealousy, false pride, or whatever, people are prepared to commit the most heinous crimes against innocent victims; and sometimes, it seems, they can be prevented only by means which no one would consider in the morally perfect world. One must choose among evils; doing a lesser evil oneself or allowing others to do an even greater evil. (shrink)

In a morally perfect world we would not face many of the hard choices which confront us in the real world. If everyone were fully conscientious, moral dilemmas might still be posed by natural circumstances; but many of our most difficult and tragic choices would not arise. In particular, we would never need to decide whether we should ourselves do a lesser evil in order to prevent someone else from doing a greater one. Unfortunately we do not live in such (...) a perfect world. Through greed, malice, jealousy, false pride, or whatever, people are prepared to commit the most heinous crimes against innocent victims; and sometimes, it seems, they can be prevented only by means which no one would consider in the morally perfect world. One must choose among evils; doing a lesser evil oneself or allowing others to do an even greater evil. (shrink)

[The Catcher in the Rye's] catalogue of characters, incidents, expressions could be extended indefinitely, all of them suggesting that Holden's sickness of soul is something deeper than economic or political, that his revulsion at life is not limited to social and monetary inequities, but at something in the nature of life itself - the decrepitude of the aged, the physical repulsiveness of the pimpled, the disappearance and dissolution of the dead, the terrors of sex, the hauntedness of human aloneness, the (...) panic of individual isolation. Headlines about Korea, Dean Acheson, and the cold war seem, if not irrelevant, essentially wide of the mark - if we define the mark as the heart and soul of Catcher. James E. Miller, Jr., author of "Henry James in Reality" and numerous books and articles on American literature, responds in this essay to Carol and Richard Ohmann's "Reviewers, Critics, and The Catcher in the Rye. The Ohmann's answer will appear in our summer issue. (shrink)

This paper seeks to provide a literary review of advancements in climate change ethics, primarily concerning the issue of climate justice. Through a close examination of three recent books written on this topic, I intend to identify which author’s approach has been the most successful in analyzing the various moral problems associated with climate justice, before elucidating what weaknesses and shortcomings need to be addressed in moving forward. The books examined are The Moral Challenge of Dangerous Climate Change: Values, (...) Poverty, and Policy, by Darrel Moellendorf ; Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle against Climate Change Failed—and What It Means for Our Future, by Dale Jamieson ; and... (shrink)

James Fitzjames Stephen is remembered as a judge, legal historian, and the author of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, a reply to J. S. Mill's late works. He is less well remembered for his journalism, though it earned him a reputation among his contemporaries as one of the most trenchant writers on topics ranging across the social, religious, political, moral, and philosophical questions debated in his time. It was largely in his journalistic writing that Stephen set forth his views on these questions. (...) Despite such a reputation, however, only a small proportion of this writing was collected during his lifetime, and very little has been republished since his death.Selected Writings of James Fitzjames Stephen: On Society, Religion, and Government includes thirty-five essays expressing Stephen's views on the questions of his day, which have not lost their interest in ours. He wrote at a time when much of the finest writing in English was published in periodicals, often anonymously. The essays in this volume are drawn mostly from Stephen's unsigned contributions to the Saturday Review, with additions, both signed and unsigned, from other periodicals, extending from the 1850s to the 1880s. (shrink)